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Abstract: 
Monetary policy analysts often rely on rules-of-thumb, such as the Taylor rule, to describe 
historical monetary policy decisions and to compare current policy to historical norms. 
Analysis along these lines also permits evaluation of episodes where policy may have 
deviated from a simple rule and examination of the reasons behind such deviations. One 
interesting question is whether such rules-of-thumb should draw on policymakers' forecasts of 
key variables such as inflation and unemployment or on observed outcomes. Importantly, 
deviations of the policy from the prescriptions of a Taylor rule that relies on outcomes may be 
due to systematic responses to information captured in policymakers' own projections.  
We investigate this proposition in the context of FOMC policy decisions over the past 20 
years using publicly available FOMC projections from the biannual monetary policy reports 
to the Congress (Humphrey-Hawkins reports). Our results indicate that FOMC decisions can 
indeed be predominantly explained in terms of the FOMC's own projections rather 
than observed outcomes. Thus, a forecast-based rule-of-thumb better characterizes FOMC 
decision-making. We also confirm that many of the apparent deviations of the federal funds 
rate from an outcome-based Taylor-style rule may be considered systematic responses to 
information contained in FOMC projections. 
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William Poole has been a long-time proponent of rules-of-thumb for monetary policy. Nearly
four decades ago, as sta® economist at the Federal Reserve Board, Poole presented a reactive
rule-of-thumb that he argued could serve as a robust guide to policy decisions (Poole, 1971).
More recently, as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and a member of the
FOMC, he has highlighted how a simple Taylor rule that systematically responds to eco-
nomic activity and in°ation can serve as a useful tool for understanding historical monetary
policy decisions (Poole, 2007). In both his recent and earlier work, Poole highlighted the
usefulness of rules-of-thumb in the context of the complexity of the macroeconomy and our
limited knowledge regarding it. In this light, a policy adviser cannot o®er precise guidance
about how the monetary authority should respond to every conceivable contingency so as
to best achieve these goals. What a policy adviser can do is identify useful rules-of-thumb
that can serve as appropriate guides to policy under most circumstances. To the extent
policymakers rely on a simple rule-of-thumb as an approximate policy guide, it should be
possible to identify this rule and use it to understand historical policy decisions and to
improve future policy.
One of the di±culties in identifying a simple rule that can serve as a useful description
of policy is that the policy prescriptions relevant for policy advice at any point in time
re°ect the information available to policymakers at that time. To the extent policy is based
on observable macroeconomic variables, a simple rule could be estimated using real-time
historical data. However, to the extent policymakers view projections of key macroeconomic
variables as more useful summary descriptions of the current state of the economy, estima-
tion of a simple rule based on those same policymaker projections would provide a more
promising avenue. Poole (2007) examines FOMC policy decisions over the past 20 years
using the simple outcome-based rule proposed by Taylor (1993). This rule uses the current
in°ation rate and output gap as inputs for federal funds rate decisions. Poole identi¯es
some deviations of policy from the systematic prescriptions suggested by the rule which
could, however, re°ect a systematic response of the FOMC to its own projections.
1Our objective in this paper is to investigate this proposition. To this end we compare
estimated policy rules that are based on recent economic outcomes to policy rules based
on the economic projections of the FOMC. We investigate whether the federal funds rate
target set by the FOMC when these projections are made responds systematically to these
projections as opposed to recent economic data.
Our results, which are based on real-time data and projections over the past 20 years, in-
dicate that interest rates respond pre-dominantly to FOMC projections, and thus a forecast-
based rule better characterizes FOMC decision-making during this period. Furthermore,
we check to what extent deviations from an outcome-based Taylor-rule may be better ex-
plained by the information incorporated in FOMC forecasts. Our analysis suggests that by
distinguishing between forecasts and outcomes one can explain a number of deviations of
policy from the simple underlying rule though it can also identify episodes where deviations
remain. This includes episodes where one would expect systematic policy to deviate from
a simple rule-of-thumb, such as the response to ¯nancial turbulence experienced in 1998.
Overall, our analysis suggests that FOMC projections used in the context of a rule-
of-thumb are quite informative for understanding historical monetary policy while similar
analysis based on economic outcomes can often be of much lower value.
2 On rules-of-thumb for monetary policy
Simple estimated rules can be useful devices for understanding historical monetary policy, if
central banks conduct policy su±ciently systematically to be captured by such rules. Poole
(1971) suggested that it is reasonable for individual policymakers to behave in a systematic
manner:
\Individual policy-makers inevitably use informal rules-of-thumb in making de-
cisions. Like everyone else, policy makers develop certain standard ways of
reacting to standard situations. These standard reactions are not, of course,
unchanging over time, but are adjusted and developed according to experience
and new theoretical ideas." (p. 151)
2Though it did not attract much attention at the time, the particular rule-of-thumb
proposed by Poole in 1971 is of interest in that it incorporated both an interest rate reaction
to real economic activity (speci¯cally the rate of unemployment deviation from the Federal
Reserve's estimate of the rate corresponding to full employment at the time) as well as a
nominal variable in a way that would ensure price stability over the long run. The latter
was not based on an interest rate response to in°ation, as is commonly speci¯ed today.
Rather, Poole's rule speci¯ed that the money supply should always be contained within
bounds as a robust means of controlling in°ation, and suggested adjusting the interest rate
so as to respond to deviations of unemployment from full employment only when doing
so would respect these bounds. In essence, Poole's rule-of-thumb uses money growth to
ensure the maintenance of price stability and, subject to that, provides counter-cyclical
policy prescriptions. He provided the following summary description:
\The proposed rule assumes that full employment exists when the unemploy-
ment rate is in the 4.0 to 4.4 per cent range. The rule also assumes that at full
employment, a growth rate of the money stock of 3 to 5 per cent per annum
is consistent with price stability. Therefore, when unemployment is in the full
employment range, the rule calls for monetary growth at the 3 to 5 per cent
rate.
The rule calls for higher monetary growth when unemployment is higher, and
lower monetary growth when unemployment is lower. Furthermore, when unem-
ployment is relatively high the rule calls for a policy of pushing the Treasury bill
rate down provided monetary growth is maintained in the speci¯ed range; simi-
larly, when unemployment is relatively low the rule calls for a policy of pushing
the Treasury bill rate up provided monetary growth is in the speci¯ed range.
Finally, the rule provides for adjusting the rate of growth of money according
to movements in the Treasury bill rate in the recent past." (p. 183)
Poole also explicitly recognized a scope for deviations from his suggested rule-of-thumb,
even if policymakers had decided to adopt it in principle. What was more important in
Poole's view was transparency in explaining the rationale for such deviations:
\it is not proposed that this rule-of-thumb or guideline be followed if there is
good reason for departure. But departures should be justi¯ed by evidence and
not be based on vague intuitive feelings of what is needed (since the rule was
3carefully designed from the theoretical and empirical analysis ..., and from a
careful review of post-accord monetary policy.)" (p. 183).
As to whether rules could usefully rely on economic projections, in 1971 Poole argued
that an important factor would be the accuracy of the forecasts:
\Given the accuracy of forecasts at the current state of knowledge, it seems
likely that for some time to come forecasts will be used primarily to supplement
a policy-decision-making process that consists largely of reactions to current de-
velopments. Only gradually will policy-makers place greater reliance on formal
forecasting models." (p. 152-153)
In 2007 Poole used a version of the classic Taylor (1993) rule to describe Federal Reserve
behavior over the past 20 years.1 As is well known, this rule posits that the systematic
component of monetary policy may be described as a notional target for the federal funds
rate, ^ f:
^ f = r¤ + ¼ + 0:5(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + 0:5y (1)
where ¼ and y re°ect contemporaneous readings of in°ation and a measure of the output
gap, respectively. Following Taylor, Poole assumed a constant in°ation target, ¼¤ and a
constant equilibrium real interest rate, r¤. Poole's rendition of the Taylor rule is reproduced
in Figure 1.
As in his work 36 years earlier, Poole explained potential sources of deviation from the
rule and also the potential use of forecasts:
\The FOMC, and certainly John Taylor himself, view the Taylor rule as a general
guideline. Departures from the rule make good sense when information beyond
that incorporated in the rule is available. For example, policy is forward looking;
which means that from time to time the economic outlook changes su±ciently
that it makes sense for the FOMC to set a funds rate either above or below the
level called for in the Taylor rule which relies on observed recent data rather
than on economic forecasts of future data. Other circumstances { an obvious
example is September 11, 2001 { call for a policy response. These responses can
1Taylor (1993) showed that the rule could describe Federal Reserve behavior from 1987 to 1992 quite well.
Interest rate rules had also acquired a normative dimension at that time due to their success in a large-scale
model comparison project reported in Bryant et al (1993) (See also Henderson and McKibbin (1993)).
4be and generally are understood by the market. Thus, such responses can be
every bit as systematic as the responses speci¯ed in the Taylor rule." (p. 6)
This last remark suggests that a better rule-of-thumb for understanding the behavior of the
Federal Reserve over the past 20 years could be a version of the Taylor rule that is explicitly
based on the FOMC's own projections. This is the subject of the investigation that follows.
3 FOMC economic projections and real-time outcomes
We begin by describing how to construct constant-horizon forecasts that can be used in
estimating a policy rule from the publicly available projections. The semi-annual monetary
policy report to the Congress (the Humphrey-Hawkins report), has presented information
on the range and central tendency of annual forecasts of FOMC members since 1979.2
Following Poole's 2007 analysis, we create a dataset of FOMC projections and corre-
sponding real-time data on observed outcomes that focuses our attention on the past 20
years.3
Regarding projections, we take the midpoints of the central tendencies reported in each
of the reports starting with February 1988 and ending with July 2007 and use these as
proxies for the modal forecasts of FOMC expectations. Our objective using these data is to
examine whether deviations from an outcome-based Taylor rule may be explained by the
additional information contained in policy makers' forecasts. These include in°ation, the
rate of unemployment and output growth. Since we could not make approximate inferences
of the Committee's forecasts of the output gap from these variables, while we do have the
FOMC's unemployment projections, we focus on a version of the Taylor rule that substitutes
the unemployment rate for the output gap. Consequently, in our dataset we focus on data
and forecasts regarding in°ation and unemployment.
Some of the particular measures have been rede¯ned over the years. For in°ation, the
2A month after this paper was ¯rst presented, on November 14, 2007, the Federal Reserve announced that
going forward the FOMC would compile and release these economic projections four times a year instead of
just two times a year, which was the practice until then.
3In earlier work|Lindsey, Orphanides and Wieland (1997)|we examined the implications of FOMC
projections for understanding policy in the sample prior to 1988 and presented some comparisons with the
1988-1996 period.
5implicit de°ator of the GNP was used through July 1988, thereafter replaced by the CPI.
In February 2000, the CPI was replaced by the PCE De°ator measure of in°ation, and
from July 2004 onwards the Committee decided to focus on the core PCE De°ator that
excludes the more volatile food and energy prices. These changes are of particular interest
as the alternative measures do not always provide similar summary readings of in°ationary
pressures. They may di®er both in their level and in their variability over time, especially
in small samples, which poses some interpretation challenges.
Figures 2 and 3 provide two recent examples useful for understanding what information
on projections is released with the monetary policy reports. Forecasts for 2007 were ¯rst
reported in July 2006 (not shown). In February 2007, revised forecasts for 2007 and ¯rst
forecasts for 2008 were reported, as shown in Figure 2. The ¯nal updated forecasts for 2007
were then published in July together with updated forecasts for 2008, as shown in Figure 3.
Although we have only two observations per year, it is convenient to describe our data
set in terms of a quarterly frequency because the FOMC projections report either quarterly
data or growth rates over 4 quarters. Denoting time (measured in quarters) with t, we
associate the February Humphrey-Hawkins report with the ¯rst quarter of the year and the
July Humphrey-Hawkins report with the third quarter. We construct a dataset containing
two sets of forecasts for each year covering four-quarter intervals that always end three
quarters in the future. For any variable x, we let xt+ijt denote the estimated outcome (for
i · 0) or forecast (for i > 0) of the value of the variable x at t + i as of time t.4 Thus,
letting u denote the rate of unemployment, ut+3jt would represent the three quarter ahead
forecast of the rate of unemployment formed during quarter t, and ut¡1jt the estimate, as of
quarter t, of what the outcome for the rate of unemployment was in the previous quarter.
As shown on the time chart in Figure 4, using the rate of unemployment as an example,
the forecasts reported to the Congress in February have exactly the desired timing. That
is, when t is the ¯rst quarter, the three-quarter-ahead forecast of unemployment, ut+3jt,
4Importantly, because of the lags with which information about the past becomes available, we need
to keep track not only of revisions of forecasts but also of revisions regarding outcomes when trying to
understand the environment in which FOMC decisions were taken. We describe the data we use for outcomes
later on.
6corresponds to the Humphrey-Hawkins forecast for the rate of unemployment in the fourth
quarter of the same year. That is, when t represents the ¯rst quarter of a year we have
ut+3jt ´ uHH
t+3jt; (2)
where we employ the superscript HH to denote the Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts.
Note that in Figure 4 the solid arrow points to the quarter on the time line for which
the unemployment rate is predicted (t+3), while the dotted line points to the quarter in
which the forecast is made (t). Similarly, for in°ation when t represents the ¯rst quarter
of a year the three-quarter-ahead forecast corresponds to the rate of growth of prices from
the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the current year, exactly
matching the horizon of the Humphrey-Hawkins forecast. Letting ¼ represent the rate of
in°ation over four quarters, when t is the ¯rst quarter of a year we have
¼t+3jt ´ ¼HH
t+3jt: (3)
For the July Humphrey-Hawkins reports, some additional work is required to obtain 3-
quarter ahead projections. We need to estimate the forecast of the unemployment rate for
next year's second quarter, and the corresponding forecast of the four-quarter growth rate
for prices that ends in the second quarter of next year, by combining available information.
The timing of the two Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts and the constructed forecast for three
quarters ahead is shown again with respect to the time line in Figure 4. In this case the
dashed arrow refers to the three-quarter ahead observation for which an unemployment
forecast is needed. We approximate the unemployment forecast in the second quarter of
the following year by simply averaging the forecasted levels for the current year's fourth
quarter and next year's fourth quarter that are contained in the report. That is, when t
represents the third quarter of the year we set
ut+3jt =
1
2
(uHH
t+1jt + uHH
t+5jt): (4)
Other than the rare occurrence of a shock known to have only transitory e®ects, for a four-
quarter interval that starts two quarters later, it is doubtful that FOMC members would
7have strong views about the likelihood of di®erent changes in the unemployment rate over
the two halves of that period. Implicitly, we assume that the changes forecasted in July for
the unemployment rate in each half of next year are about the same.
The desired second-quarter-to-second-quarter forecasts of the growth rate of prices is ob-
tained by constructing two forecasted half-year annualized growth rates and then averaging
them. In other words, when t represents the third quarter of the year we set
¼t+3jt =
1
2
(¼S
t+1jt + ¼S
t+3jt) (5)
where S stands for semi-annual, so that ¼S
t+1jt is the in°ation forecast for the second half of
the current year, and ¼S
t+3jt is the forecast for the ¯rst half of the following year.
The in°ation forecasted for the second half of the current year, ¼S
t+1jt, can be inferred
from the forecast reported for all of the year from a base of last year's fourth quarter, ¼HH
t+1jt,
and the estimated in°ation over the ¯rst half of the current year from a fourth quarter of
last year base, ¼S
t¡1jt. That is, expressing all terms as annualized growth rates, when t is a
third quarter
¼S
t+1jt = 2¼HH
t+1jt ¡ ¼S
t¡1jt: (6)
For ¼S
t+3jt, in°ation over the ¯rst half of the next year, we simply set it equal to the
forecast for all of next year contained in the July Humphrey-Hawkins report. That is, we
set
¼S
t+3jt = ¼HH
t+5jt: (7)
The in°ation rate estimated for the ¯rst half of the current year as of July of the same
year, that is ¼S
t¡1jt, is not available in the Humphrey-Hawkins report. Thus, instead we
make use of alternative real-time data sources which are discussed below.
To allow for a direct comparison of rules based on the forecasts described above to rules
based on outcomes of these variables, we construct parallel variables re°ecting the latest
historical information available to the FOMC at the time of the meetings preceding the two
Humphrey-Hawkins reports in every year.
Thus, for the unemployment rate, we create the variable ut¡1jt which for the February
observation re°ects the average level in the fourth quarter of the prior year and for the July
8observation re°ects the average level in the second quarter of the current year. Similarly, for
in°ation, we create the variable ¼t¡1jt which re°ects the four-quarter growth rate of prices
ending in the fourth quarter of the prior year for the February observation, and ending in
the second quarter of the current year for the July observation.
An important aspect of our analysis is to ensure that our de¯nition of outcomes re°ects
only information available to the FOMC in real time. To that end, we rely only on data
which would have been available to the FOMC by early February or early July. This implies
that the data we use correspond either to preliminary estimates, ¯rst reported quarterly
data or estimates based on partial data for the quarter.
To match the timing of this information as closely as possible, for the years 1988 through
2001 inclusive, we use Board-sta® estimates of outcomes ending in the prior quarter con-
tained in the Greenbook that is distributed to the FOMC prior to the early February or
early July FOMC meetings. Even so, because Greenbook data remain con¯dential for ¯ve
years, we cannot rely on that source for the last few years of our sample. Instead, from 2002
to 2007 we use real-time vintage data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ALFRED
database.5 For these dates we use the data vintage from ALFRED that was available one
week after the respective February and July HH meetings. We choose the timing after the
meeting because FOMC members have the opportunity to revise their projections during a
window of a few days following the meeting.
4 Estimated policy rules: FOMC projections versus recent
outcomes
4.1 Speci¯cation
The interest rate rules we estimate all share the following underlying structure with Taylor's
(1993) rule. They posit that the systematic component of monetary policy can be described
as a notional target for the federal funds rate, ^ f, which increases with in°ation, ¼, and real
activity.
5As a robustness check, we have investigated how much the ALFRED-based information di®ers from
Greenbook information in the years until 2001 when both are available. Although the data source does
in°uence the data values somewhat, the di®erences were small.
9As already mentioned with regard to projections of real activity, we do not have informa-
tion about the FOMC's assessment of the output gap. Thus, we cannot directly estimate
an exact counterpart of the rule proposed by Taylor. Instead, an indirect comparison is
feasible, using the unemployment rate, u, as a measure of the level of economic activity.6
Following Taylor we restrict attention to a linear speci¯cation of the rule and posit that7
^ f = a0 + a¼¼ + auu (8)
We note that we do not have direct information on the policymakers' views regarding the
equilibrium interest rate, r¤, the in°ation target, ¼¤ or the natural rate of unemployment
u¤. If these concepts are roughly constant over the sample period, then they would be
subsumed in the estimated intercept, a0 = r¤ ¡ (a¼ ¡ 1)¼¤ ¡ auu¤.
In estimating our speci¯cation we need to take an explicit stand regarding the explana-
tory variable as well as the timing of the information about in°ation and real activity that
the FOMC takes into account in their policy decision. As to the FOMC's policy instru-
ment, that is the interest rate on the left-hand-side of the rule, we use the Committee's
intended level of the federal funds rate as of the close of ¯nancial markets on the day after
the February and July FOMC meetings.
Regarding the information on the current or projected future state of the economy, we
set
^ ft = a0 + a¼¼¿jt + auu¿jt (9)
where ¿ captures the particular timing. The explanatory variables ¼¿jt and u¿jt, are meant
to encompass the information variables to which the FOMC may be reacting. In this
speci¯cation, ¿ = t ¡ 1 if the rule-of thumb is outcome-based, while ¿ = t + 3 if it is based
on the 3-quarter ahead projections.
6The di®erence between the unemployment rate and a constant natural rate (NAIRU) can then be
translated into an estimate of the output gap by means of Okun's law.
7The linearity assumption is purely for simplicity in the spirit of the Taylor rule. Non-linear reaction
functions such as those characterizing \opportunistic disin°ation" examined by Orphanides and Wilcox
(2002), and Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (2006) and those incorporating asymmetric
easing near the zero-bound for nominal interest rates as derived by Orphanides and Wieland (2000) would
likely be more realistic but more complicated depictions of policy.
10Figure 5 again employs a time line to put the timing of the explanatory variables into
perspective, using the unemployment outcomes and forecasts as an example. Again, the
arrows point to the quarter to which the forecast or outcome applies, while the dotted line
points to the date on which the forecast or the estimate of the outcome are made.
In our estimation, we also allow for the possibility that the FOMC has a preference for
policy inertia and perhaps only partially adjusts the intended federal funds rate, f, towards
its notional target, ^ f. We introduce such inertial behavior by allowing the FOMC decision
prior to one Humphrey-Hawkins report to be in°uenced by the level of the intended federal
funds rate decided at the FOMC meeting before the previous Humphrey-Hawkins report.
With our timing convention, this can be written as
ft = (1 ¡ ½) ^ ft + ½ft¡2 (10)
where ½ provides a measure of the degree of partial adjustment. Thus, the restriction, ½ = 0,
would re°ect an immediate adjustment of the intended federal funds rate to its notional
target.
4.2 Regression estimates: 1988 - 2007
The results from our regression analysis using our sample of Humphrey-Hawkins report data
from 1988 to the present are summarized in Table 1. The estimates shown are obtained by
non-linear least squares regressions applied to the equation:
ft = ½ft¡2 + (1 ¡ ½)(a0 + a¼¼¿jt + auu¿jt) (11)
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 the regressions are based on outcomes ¿ = t¡1 while
in columns (3) and (4) they are based on forecasts with ¿ = t + 3. Standard errors are
shown under the parameter estimates. In columns (1) and (3) the restriction, ½ = 0, is
imposed, while in columns (2) and (4) the unrestricted partial adjustment speci¯cation is
shown.
In all regressions shown in the table we ¯nd that the estimated rules-of-thumb suggest
a systematic response to in°ation and unemployment. The response to in°ation is posi-
11tive and noticeably greater than 1, suggesting all these rules satisfy the Taylor principle.
And the response to unemployment is negative and also quite large, suggesting a strong
countercyclical stabilization response. These ¯ndings are quite robust and hold regardless
of whether we employ FOMC projections or recent economic outcomes and regardless of
whether we allow for some degree of interest-rate smoothing or not.
However, not all speci¯cations describe policy decisions equally successfully. A compar-
ison of the regressions based on recent outcomes, (1) and (2), to those based on FOMC
projections, (3) and (4), reveals that the forecast-based rules describe policy decisions quite
a bit better than the corresponding outcome-based rules. We also estimate a richer but
more complicated speci¯cation that nests the regressions with forecasts and outcomes as
limiting cases.8 Estimates of this speci¯cation with an estimated weight on forecasts near
unity (not shown) con¯rm the above result. Furthermore, our results suggest a substantial
degree of inertia in setting policy.
We conclude that a rule-of-thumb that is based on the FOMC's own projections of
in°ation and unemployment, and allows for inertial behavior can serve as a very good guide
for understanding the systematic nature of FOMC decisions over the past twenty years.
The improved ¯t of the forecast-based rule relative to the outcome-based rule also sug-
gests that at least some of the apparent deviations of actual interest rates from an outcome-
based Taylor rule, such as described in Poole (2007), may be easily explained once FOMC
forecasts are examined. To explore this question further, in Figure 6 we plot the ¯tted val-
ues of the forecast-based and outcome-based rules estimated in Table 1. The upper panel
of the ¯gure contains the rules without interest-rate smoothing corresponding to columns
(1) and (3) in Table 1. The black line, denoted by "federal funds" refers to the actual
federal funds rate target decided on February and July FOMC meetings from 1988 to 2007.
The thin blue line corresponds to the outcome-based rule and the red dashed line to the
forecast-based rule.
The ¯gure con¯rms visually that the forecast-based rule explains the federal funds rate
8In this case, the measure of in°ation conditions in the regression is de¯ned as ¼, ¼¿jt ´ (1 ¡ Á)¼t¡1jt +
Á¼t+3jt;. Similarly, the measure on unemployment conditions depends on the weight Á.
12target path better than the outcome-based rule. Of course, the ¯t is further improved once
we allow for interest rate smoothing, in other words partial adjustment of the funds rate
depending on last period's realization. This can be seen from the lower panel in the ¯gure.
Again, the blue line corresponds to the outcome-based rule and the red line to the forecast-
based rule, but now the ¯tted path is smoother as it takes into account the estimated degree
of partial adjustment.
Based on the ¯gure, we can identify 5 periods where the outcome- and forecast-based
rules diverge from each other in an interesting manner and which can improve our un-
derstanding of the role of projections for FOMC policy decisions. Two of these episodes,
around 1988 and 1994, correspond to periods of rising policy rates. In both of these peri-
ods, the FOMC was raising rates preemptively because of concerns regarding the outlook
for in°ation. Correspondingly, the forecast based rules track policy decisions better, while
the outcome-based rules only manage to describe policy with a noticeable lag.
Two other episodes, in 1990-91 and in 2001, correspond to periods of falling policy
rates. In both of these periods, the FOMC was easing policy out of concern of a faltering
economy, clearly in°uenced by its projections of relatively weak economic activity. Again,
the forecast-based rules track policy decisions better while the outcome-based rules exhibit
a noticeable lag.
The last episode is 2002-03, when the forecast-based rule correctly tracked the further
policy easing at the early stages of the recovery from the recession, while the outcome-based
rule suggested that policy should have been considerably tighter.
Of interest are also two additional episodes when the forecast-based rule-of-thumb did
not track the actual policy setting as well but where the resulting deviations can be explained
by other factors which are not part of the rule. The ¯rst of these is the 1998 policy easing.
On that occasion the FOMC was responding to the underlying ¯nancial turbulence which
intensi¯ed that fall, a factor not well re°ected in the rule-of-thumb, even considering its
forward looking nature.
The second and arguably more controversial episode is the miss re°ected in the rule-of-
13thumb during 2004. This is more controversial because of recent criticisms that policy was
much easier than would have been suggested by simple Taylor rules during this episode. This
is evident, for example, in Poole's rendition of the classic Taylor rule, reproduced in Figure
1. It has been argued that this policy stance may have contributed to the subsequent
housing boom and associated price adjustments and liquidity di±culties experienced in
¯nancial markets (Taylor (2007)). Indeed, as is well known, around 2003-04 the FOMC was
particularly concerned with the risks of de°ation and perceived an important asymmetry in
the costs associated with a possible policy misjudgment. In particular, the costs of policy
proving too tight were perceived as considerably exceeding the costs of policy proving to
be too easy.9 Under these circumstances, it should be expected that even a rule-of-thumb
that might track policy nearly perfectly under normal circumstances would not accurately
characterize policy and that policy would be easier than suggested by the rule. Even so,
we ¯nd that the rule with FOMC projections tracks the federal funds rate target quite well
through the ¯rst half of 2004, and that the only noticeable deviation is that it would have
already called for much more aggressive tightening starting in the second half of 2004 than
actually took place.
4.3 Time-variation in natural rates
One might have suspected that the FOMC-projections-based rule-of-thumb presented in
Table 1 could have proved too simple to capture the contours of FOMC decisions during
the past 20 years. In that light, the explanatory power of the rule shown in Figure 6 may
be considered surprisingly good.
One reason to suspect that a rule based on the notional target:
^ ft = a0 + a¼¼tjt+3 + auutjt+3 (12)
might be too simple is the constant intercept. As already mentioned, this would not be
of concern if FOMC beliefs regarding its in°ation objective, and natural rates of interest
9The suggested rationale was the uncertainty arising with operating policy near the zero bound. See
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) for a model demonstrating the optimality of unusually accommodative
policy in light of the asymmetric risks associated with the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
14and unemployment were roughly constant over the estimation sample. If any of the above
exhibited time-variation, however, a better description of FOMC behavior would be in terms
of the following similar, but not identical, rule:
^ ft = r¤
t + ¼¤
t + a¼(¼tjt+3 ¡ ¼¤
t) + au(utjt+3 ¡ u¤
t) (13)
which suggests a time-varying intercept a0;t = r¤
t ¡(a¼¡1)¼¤
t ¡auu¤
t. Unfortunately, absent
the necessary information required to proxy the Committee's real-time assessments of ¼¤,
u¤ and r¤ in our sample, it is di±cult to examine if a version of the rule allowing for such
variation could explain the data even better than the rule-of-thumb based on equation (12).
As a simple check in that direction, however, we re-estimated the rule using a possible
proxy of the FOMC's likely perceptions of the natural rate of unemployment, u¤. Absent
the Committee's own assessment, we relied on the real-time estimates published by the
Congressional Budget O±ce over the past 20 years. This is the same source of real-time
estimates used by Poole (2007) as a proxy for Federal Reserve sta® estimates.
The results (not shown) were broadly similar to those presented in Table 1 and Figure 6.
As with the baseline speci¯cation, the data suggest that the FOMC-projection based rule
can describe policy decisions quite well. However, the overall ¯t of our preferred forecast-
based regression does not improve with the inclusion of the real-time CBO estimate of
the natural rate of unemployment. Rather, the ¯t deteriorates slightly. Two possible
explanations for this are as follows. First, the CBO estimate may not capture the updating
patterns of the FOMC's own real-time estimates of the natural rate. Second, even in the
presence of time variation in the natural rate of unemployment, countervailing time variation
in the natural rate of interest might keep the intercept in the rule of thumb, a0;t, roughly
constant. If so, correcting for the time variation in u¤ without a parallel correction for the
time variation in r¤ should result in a deterioration in the ¯t of the rule.
4.4 Interpreting changes in the FOMC's preferred in°ation concept
Another reason one might be concerned that the rule-of-thumb based on equation (12), as
estimated in Table 1, might be too simple relates to the choice of in°ation measure by the
15FOMC. The decisions of the Committee to change its in°ation projections, e.g. from CPI
to PCE in 2000 and from PCE to core PCE in 2004 may be due to changes in preference
as to the most appropriate concept for the measurement of in°ation for monetary policy
purposes. To the extent that the typical dynamic behavior of the new measure di®ers
from the one used previously, FOMC members would probably make adjustments in their
systematic response to movements in the in°ation measure.
To gain some insight into the possible implications of the FOMC turning from the overall
CPI measure of in°ation, to overall PCE and then the core PCE measure excluding the
volatile food and energy prices, we compare the three series in Figure 7. The top panel
shows the three series (percentage change in the price index relative to four quarters earlier)
for the full sample under consideration, 1988 - 2007. The lower panel provides a detailed
view of the most recent 10 years, between 1997 and 2007.
As can be seen, from 1990 to 1998 the three alternative in°ation series steadily declined
more or less in lockstep with each other, the CPI series starting from a higher level than
the other two measures. The core PCE seems to best capture the downward trend over
this period. The comparison suggests that ex post, a policy rule could have delivered fairly
similar policy implications regardless of which of these in°ation measures was used over this
period.10
From 1999 onwards the three series exhibit some important di®erences. For instance,
while all three in°ation rates indicate rising in°ation in 1999, the in°ationary surge seemed
much stronger in the overall CPI and PCE measures than in the core PCE. In fact, core
PCE in°ation stayed largely within the Federal Reserve's so-called \comfort zone" of 1 to
2 percent all the way through 2007. CPI and PCE in°ation however surged up two more
times, in 2002 and in 2004, with CPI in°ation reaching 4 percent in 2006. The overall PCE
measure more or less follows the movements of the CPI albeit staying somewhat below all
throughout. Clearly, these increases must have been related to the movements of food and
energy prices.
10Note, however, that these series are compared from the perspective of the July 2007 vintage and not the
real-time policymaker perspective.
16These di®erences pose a challenge in that the di®erent statistical properties of the al-
ternative measures could in principle in°uence, perhaps in subtle ways, the speci¯cation of
a rule-of-thumb. One potential result of the switch from CPI to PCE, for instance, could
have been a change in the operational de¯nition of price stability embedded in the rule,
that is ¼¤. Stated in PCE terms, ¼¤ could be 50 or so basis points lower than the cor-
responding object stated in CPI terms, re°ecting recent estimates of the 50 basis points
average di®erence in the two series. On the other hand, given the uncertainty associated
with price measurement and the quantitative de¯nition of price stability most appropriate
for monetary policy, it is not entirely clear that such a change in the ¼¤ embedded in a
rule-of-thumb should be incorporated to the analysis when the FOMC changes its preferred
in°ation measure.
In light of these uncertainties and the di®erential movements of core PCE, PCE and
CPI in°ation|especially from 2000 onwards, we decided to perform two experiments that
could help examine potential in°uences of the changes in the in°ation concept on policy.
One way to examine whether the policy rule has changed with the switch of in°ation
measures is to allow for changes in the intercept and/or slope coe±cients at those points
in time. We did so by introducing the appropriate additive and multiplicative dummy
variables in our regression equations and re-estimating over the full sample from 1988 to
2007. We consider possible shifts in 2000:1 (for the switch to PCE) as well as in 2004:3
(for the switch to core PCE). The results (not shown) did not indicate any signi¯cant shifts
suggesting that changes in the speci¯cation of the rule-of-thumb with FOMC projections
associated with the changes in the in°ation concept were too small to identify with our
limited sample.
Another way to examine possible di®erences since 1999 is to re-estimate the regressions
presented in Table 1 using only the sub-sample 1988-1999 to see if excluding the period
following the switch to PCE and later to core PCE would materially in°uence the results.
The regression estimates are reported in Table 2, based on equation (11), as before. The
results are presented in identical fashion as in Table 1. Comparing the estimates to those
17shown in Table 1 shows that the coe±cients of the outcome-based rule change quite a bit.
This instability reinforces the prior evidence that the outcome-based rule is misspeci¯ed as
a description of FOMC policy since it does not account properly for forecasts.
The key result in Table 2 is that the estimates corresponding to the forecast-based rule
for the subsample ending in 1999 do not materially di®er from those corresponding to the
full sample. This suggests that the change in in°ation concepts may not have resulted
in a corresponding change in the rule-of-thumb describing FOMC decisions, or that this
corresponding change was rather small. Indeed, this is con¯rmed in Figure 8 where we
show the estimated rule over the subsample ending in 1999 and a simulation that uses these
parameter estimates together with the FOMC projections for subsequent years. Focusing
on the results for the forecast-based rule con¯rms that interest-rate setting in the 2000 to
2006 period seemed in line with a systematic interest rate response to FOMC projections
with the same coe±cients, despite the change in in°ation concepts. The results shown are
for the policy rule without interest rate smoothing.
This ¯nding is somewhat puzzling, especially in light of the average di®erence expected
in measured in°ation in terms of CPI as opposed to PCE or core PCE (approximately 50
basis points). One might have expected that the switch to PCE would be accompanied
by a countervailing adjustment in the parameters of the rule. Instead, use of the identical
rule with the PCE instead of the CPI, assuming that PCE in°ation forecasts are lower, on
average, than corresponding CPI forecasts, would result in lower interest rate prescriptions,
on average.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this e®ect we simulated the rule with parameters
estimated over the subsample ending in 1999 using the Bluechip consensus forecasts of CPI
in°ation from 1988 to 2007. The results are shown by the red, dashed line in the lower panel
of Figure 9. From 1988 to the ¯rst half of 2002, the resulting interest rate prescriptions are
broadly in line with the prescriptions obtained when using the FOMC projections. From the
second of 2002 till 2006, however, the rule simulated with Bluechip CPI forecasts implies a
higher federal funds rate target. In other words, if the FOMC had continued to forecast CPI
18in°ation and if its forecasts had been similar to those of the Bluechip consensus from 2002
onwards, the FOMC projections-based rule-of-thumb would have suggested systematically
tighter policy than the policy setting suggested with the PCE and core PCE projections.
5 Conclusion
Many analysts often rely on rules-of-thumb, such as Taylor rules, to describe historical mon-
etary policy decisions and to compare current policy to historical norms. William Poole's
(1971) study, written explicitly to o®er advice to the FOMC, serves as an early example
of such work. Analyses along these lines also permit evaluation of episodes where policy
may have deviated from a simple policy rule and examination of the reasons behind such
deviations. But there is disagreement as to whether the canonical rules-of-thumb for such
work should draw on forecasts or recent outcomes of key variables such as in°ation and
unemployment. Poole (2007) points out that deviations of the actual funds rate from the
prescriptions of a Taylor rule that relies on current readings of in°ation and the output
gap may be due to systematic responses of the FOMC to information not contained in
these variables. He notes, however, that much of this additional information may be cap-
tured in economic projections. We investigate this proposition in the context of FOMC
policy decisions over the past 20 years using publicly available FOMC projections from
the Humphrey-Hawkins reports that are published twice a year. Our results indicate that
FOMC decisions can be predominantly explained in terms of the FOMC's own projections
rather than recent economic outcomes. Thus, a forecast-based rule better characterizes
FOMC decision-making. We also identify a di±culty associated with the Committee's
switches of the in°ation concept it has been using to communicate its in°ation projections.
Finally, we con¯rm that many of the apparent deviations of the federal funds rate from
an outcome-based Taylor-style rule may be viewed as systematic responses to information
contained in FOMC projections.
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20Table 1: Policy Reaction to In°ation and Unemployment Rates
Outcomes versus FOMC Forecasts 1988-2007:2
Regression based on
outcomes forecasts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a0 8:29 10:50 6:97 8:25
1:08 3:07 0:69 0:85
a¼ 1:54 1:29 2:34 2:48
0:16 0:43 0:12 0:14
au ¡1:40 ¡1:70 ¡1:53 ¡1:84
0:21 0:55 0:14 0:17
½ 0 0:69 0 0:39
0:14 0:06
¹ R2 0:74 0:84 0:91 0:96
SEE 1:10 0:85 0:64 0:44
DW 1:00 1:03 1:74 1:94
Notes: The regressions shown are least squares estimates of the
equation:
ft = ½ft¡2 + (1 ¡ ½)(a0 + a¼¼¿jt + auu¿jt):
Here, f denotes the intended federal funds rate, ¼ the in°ation
rate over four quarters, and u the unemployment rate. The
horizon ¿ either refers to three-quarter-ahead forecasts, ¿ = t+3,
or outcomes observed in the preceding quarter, ¿ = t ¡ 1.
21Table 2: Policy Reaction to In°ation and Unemployment Rates
Period with FOMC Forecasts of CPI In°ation: 1988-1999
Regression based on
outcomes forecasts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a0 9:78 12:73 6:31 7:34
1:38 4:57 0:99 1:16
a¼ 1:11 0:72 2:32 2:54
0:19 0:62 0:20 0:23
au ¡1:35 ¡1:68 ¡1:41 ¡1:72
0:25 0:71 0:17 0:22
½ 0 0:69 0 0:41
0:20 0:08
¹ R2 0:68 0:78 0:87 0:94
SEE 1:03 0:84 0:64 0:43
DW 0:98 1:18 1:65 1:96
Notes: The regressions shown are least squares estimates of the
equation:
ft = ½ft¡2 + (1 ¡ ½)(a0 + a¼¼¿jt + auu¿jt):
Here, f denotes the intended federal funds rate, ¼ the in°ation
rate over four quarters, and u the unemployment rate. The
horizon ¿ either refers to three-quarter-ahead forecasts, ¿ = t+3,
or outcomes observed in the preceding quarter, ¿ = t ¡ 1.
22Figure 1: Poole (2007) Version of Taylor’s Rule
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Notes: The light solid line shows Taylor’s rule constructed using the Federal Reserve Board’s real-
time output gap estimate. The light dashed line extends the rule using the output gap estimate of
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce for those years for which the Board estimate is not yet public
information.
23Figure 2: FOMC Forecasts in the Humphrey-Hawkins Report: February 2007
Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents for 2007 and 2008
Percent
Change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter1
Nominal GDP  .........................................................................  5.9  4¾  –5½  5  –  5½  4¾  –5½  4¾ –  5¼
Real GDP ...............................................................................  3.4  2¼  –3¼  2½  –  3  2½  –  3¼  2¾  –3
PCE price index excluding food and energy  ..........................  2.3  2  –2¼  2  –  2¼  1½  –2¼  1¾  –2
Average level, fourth quarter
Civilian unemployment rate  ...................................................  4.5  4½  –4¾  4½  –  4¾  4½  –  5  4½ –  4¾ 
  1.  Change from average for fourth quarter of previous year to average for fourth quarter of year indicated.
Indicator
MEMO
2006 actual Range Central
tendency Range Central
tendency
2008 2007
24Figure 3: FOMC Forecasts in the Humphrey-Hawkins Report: July 2007
Economic projections for 2007 and 2008
Percent
Change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter1
Nominal GDP  .........................................................  4½  –5½  4½ – 5
Real GDP ...............................................................  2  –2¾  2¼ – 2½
PCE price index excluding food and energy  ..........  2 – 2¼  2 – 2¼
Average level, fourth quarter
Civilian unemployment rate  ...................................  4½ – 4¾  4½ – 4¾
Change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter1
Nominal GDP  .........................................................  4½ – 5½  4¾ – 5
Real GDP ...............................................................  2½ – 3  2½ – 2¾
PCE price index excluding food and energy  ..........  1¾ – 2  1¾ – 2
Average level, fourth quarter
Civilian unemployment rate  ...................................  4½ – 5  About 4¾
1.  Change from average for fourth quarter of previous year to average for 
fourth quarter of year indicated.
Federal Reserve Governors
and
Reserve Bank presidents
Indicator
Range
Central
tendency
2007
2008
25Figure 4: The Timing of the Forecasts in the Humphrey-Hawkins Report: Unemploy-
ment Rates
Q4 Q4 Q4 Q2 Q2 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q3 Q3
uHH
t+3|t
uHH
t+1|t
ut+3|t
uHH
t+5|t
February Report
July Report
26Figure 5: The Timing of the Explanatory Variables: Outcomes and Forecasts of Unem-
ployment
Q4 Q4 Q4 Q2 Q2 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q3 Q3
ut−1|t
ut+3|t
ut−1|t
ut+3|t
February Report
July Report
27Figure 6: Outcome-based versus Forecast-based Rules 1988 - 2007
No Interest Rate Smoothing
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Notes: ”FedFunds”alwaysreferstothefederal fundsratetarget. ”Outcomes”refers
to ﬁtted values of the outcome-based rule without and with interest rate smoothing,
i.e. column (1) and column (2) in Table 1, respectively. ”Forecasts” refers to the
ﬁtted values of the forecast-based rule without and with interest smoothing, i.e.
column (3) and column (4) in Table 1, respectively.
28Figure 7: CPI, PCE and core PCE Inﬂation (vintage July 2007)
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29Figure 8: Rules Estimated 1988 - 1999 and Extrapolated to 2007
Simulation Using PCE and Core PCE Inﬂation
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Fed Funds Outcomes Forecasts
Simulation Using CPI Outcomes and Bluechip CPI Forecasts
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Notes: ”Fed Funds” always refers to the federal funds rate target. ”Outcomes”
refers to ﬁtted values of the outcome-based rule without interest rate smoothing,
i.e. column (1) in Table 1. ”Forecasts” refers to the ﬁtted values of the forecast-
based rule without smoothing, i.e. column (3) in Table 1. In the lower panel these
two rules are simulated with CPI inﬂation outcomes and Bluechip CPI forecasts,
respectively, from 1988 to 2007.
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